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ABSTRACT: This paper aims to indicate the key issues yielding to explain why a regulatory framework and 
correct policy responses are needed for what here we define as a platform ‘society’ and to identify its key 
‘collective’ features. These include the respect of workers’ fundamental rights (i.e. collective bargaining 
and representation) as well as they include the role of the state and public policy. These reflections are 




KEYWORDS: gig-economy, platform, digital, work, employment 
 
 






 “This publication is part of ResPectMe that has received funding from the European Research Council 
(ERC AdG)) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant agree-
ment No. 833577). It is based on a Key note given at the conference “Lavoro e Relazioni Industriali nell’Era 
Digitale. Analisi, Percorsi, Regolazioni”, Associazione Italiana Relazioni Industriali, Roma, 8 April 2019.   
 




1. What are the implications of digital platforms for work and employment?  
 
Digital labour platforms are defined as digital networks that coordinate labour ser-
vice transactions in an algorithmic way (see e.g. Lehdonvirta 2018; Vallas 2019). The 
implications of digital labour platforms for work and employment are ambivalent. On 
the one hand, they can lower the entry barriers to the labour market, facilitate work 
participation through better matching procedures and ease the working conditions of 
specific groups (i.e. workers with strong family commitments, people with disabilities 
or health conditions, youth, people not in education, employment or training – NEETs - 
older workers, retired, long-term unemployed, people with a migrant background) (e.g. 
Huws et al. 2017). On the other hand, digital labour platforms typically rely on a work-
force of independent contractors whose conditions of employment, representation 
and social protection are at best unclear, at worst clearly disadvantaged (e.g. Wood et 
al. 2019a; 2019b).  
However, the implications of digital labour platforms go beyond working conditions 
and employment regulation: they can involve a significant re-organisation of work and 
production processes. We can call this (potential) effect of digital labour platforms an 
'unbundling of tasks', which is in fact a radical deepening of the traditional division of 
labour, typical of Fordism. The principle of the division of labour suggests that jobs 
specialisation raises productivity, and leads to a more effective control of the produc-
tion process. However, jobs as we know them today do not consist of a unique task; 
rather they are bundles of tasks with higher or lower degrees of complementarities. 
Combining complementary tasks into jobs increases workers' productivity and facili-
tates the organization of production. Any unbundling of tasks, therefore, should be 
such that the gains from additional task specialisation exceed the loss in productivity. 
Up to today the limits of task specialisation were mostly attributed to the presence of 
transaction costs and limited market size. Digital labour platforms change the limits of 
task specialisation, facilitating the unbundling of tasks. The augmented computing 
power, in particular thanks to the advent of cloud computing, gave access to abundant 
resources of computer storage and data collection that, together with the mediation of 
algorithms, allow for an efficient distribution of resources and a consistent reduction of 
transaction costs. Furthermore, digital labour platforms can also broaden the geo-
graphic boundaries of labour markets and operate very efficiently at a global scale. The 
ability of digital platforms to pool together at almost no cost millions of service provid-
ers, with increasing offshoring and outsourcing of tasks, can result in even further task 
specialisation to the detriment of jobs as we have traditionally known them.  
 




The broader social implications of this breakdown of jobs and unbundling of tasks 
are still unclear. It is a well-known insight of sociology and social sciences more broadly 
that jobs are not only contracts for the provision of labour services, but positions in the 
social structure that provide access to resources, identity and recognition. More specif-
ically, in Durkheim’s words, jobs are a crucial anchor of ‘organic solidarity’, a system of 
representations rooted in and reflective of concrete social groups. The dissolution of 
jobs into atomised tasks provided via digital platforms could therefore undermine this 
crucial role of jobs as anchors of the social structure. On the other hand, by owing their 
market access to global platforms, independent contractors are highly dependent on 
the former. This has also implications for value creation and its distribution among 
those who bear most the economic and social risk (including the access to social pro-
tection). Attention has recently focused on digital platforms by emphasizing and study-
ing the connections between transformations of capitalism and trends in work and 
employment (Zuboff 2015; 2019), and the global platforms' dual role as drivers for in-
clusion and inequality played out on dimensions such as race, class, gender, skills, disa-
bility or legal status (Schor and Attwood-Charles, 2017). Particularly it is the scrutiny of 
this inequality with regards to digitalization which needs much research nowadays.  
On the other hand, and in many cases, what is key is less the ‘digital’ (i.e. the tech-
nology) and more the ‘platform’ (i.e. the organization of work and production). In other 
words, the opportunity which the digital platform arises come from innovative busi-
ness models which are made possible by the very forces that are redefining globaliza-
tion (Zysman and Newman 2006). These models rely less on the physical movement of 
goods and fixed investments in markets, and more on leveraging digital connectivity 
and ecosystems to expand across borders. The digital connectivity which is created  - 
and operationalized through the idea of the digital platforms - generates different ‘digi-
tal platforms’ which are diverse in the way work and production is organized, function 
and structure. For example, Google and Facebook are digital platforms that offer 
search and social media, but they also provide an infrastructure on which other plat-
forms are built. Amazon is a marketplace, as are Etsy and eBay. Amazon Web Services 
provides infrastructure and tools with which others can build yet more platforms. 
Airbnb and Uber use these newly available cloud tools to force deep changes in a varie-
ty of incumbent businesses. Together they are provoking reorganization of a wide vari-
ety of markets, work arrangements, and ultimately redefine modes of value creation 
and value capture. 
In particular, the gig-economy comprises a distinctly new set of economic relations 
that depend on the Internet, computation, and data. The ecosystem created by each 
platform is a source of value and sets the terms by which users can participate. This 




generate value creation (Foster 2019).  Who does capture the created value? This im-
plies to examine the distribution of risks and rewards for the platform users. There are 
a variety of mechanisms with various implications for gains distribution. Some plat-
forms allow the owner to tax all transactions, whereas others monetize their services 
through advertising. Platforms can transform work previously done by traditional em-
ployees into tasks performed by contractors, consigners, or quid pro quo workers—or 
create entirely new categories of work.  Therefore, it is the degree of dependency on 
the digitation of value creating human activity which is generating value capture. For 
example, in accordance to this logic Uber, Airbnb, and Facebook monetize human ef-
fort and consumer assets. This illustrates that the advantage of digital platforms often 
rests on an arbitrage between the practices adopted by platform firms and the rules by 
which established companies operate, which are intended to protect customers, com-
munities, workers, and markets. Lyft and Airbnb are entrepreneurial initiatives that fa-
cilitate the conversion of consumption goods such as automobiles and apartments into 
goods that are monetized. Overall, this illustrates that the ‘sharing’ of the sharing or 
gig-economy has a more than passing resemblance to the ‘putting-out economy’  that 
existed before factories (Zysman and Newman 2006), when companies would ship ma-
terials to people to assemble items such as shoes, clothing, or firearms in their homes. 
In the current manifestation of putting out, the platform operator has unprecedented 
control over the compensation for and organization of work, while still claiming to be 
only an intermediary. 
In virtual platforms, employers can hire the workers, not by the day but by the task, 
which can in the last minutes or seconds adapt the workforce to the needs of the mo-
ment. Moreover, digital platforms enjoy the freedom to set prices that does not exist in 
the field of labour protection (considering the minimum wage). Because a traditional 
company cannot compete with a company that sources all its services from independ-
ent contractors, as a traditional company has to pay the minimum wage, we may ex-
pect that in a free market economy, without public intervention, the traditional organi-
zational model of industrial relations appears to be doomed to disappear as the result 
of the raising of legal uncertainty concerning the rules which apply in the digital space.  
On the other hand, the competition and rise to the bottom of working conditions 
and social protection for those operating within the gig-economy crosses the borders 
between paid an unpaid work where precariousness unfolds (Pulignano 2019). One of 
the few detailed empirical investigations of remote gig work is Berg’s (2016) survey of 
1510 workers on MTurk and CrowdFlower. Berg (2016) found low pay to be a problem, 
and that major contributors to low pay are the high ratio of unpaid work to paid labour 
and a lack of available work. Moreover, workers without alternative employment 




(around 40 % of Berg’s sample) lacked employment-linked social security (Berg, 2016). 
Likewise, D’Cruz and Noronha (2016) found that Upwork workers undertake substan-
tial unpaid work in order to get paid work, and this invariably meant working at night. 
The competitive work organization, whereby all workers can view each other’s bids, 
was also found to be a source of downward pressure on pay rates. 
Several studies have also shown that programmers frequently participate in corpo-
rate-led ‘hackathons’, mobilising their skills without compensation and without any 
property rights to the products they themselves create (Zukin and Papadonatakis, 
2018). Participants in platform-based firms must spend a great deal of time establish-
ing an online presence, and frequently engage in lengthy efforts to compete for pro-
jects, with no certainty of reward (Aloisi et al., 2017; Ekbia and Nardi, 2017). Online 
platforms (e.g. Upwork, Freelancer, Amazon Mechanical Turk) enable individuals to 
gain virtual access to other individuals at global level in order to resolve specific prob-
lems and provide services in person and/or in situ (e.g. Deliveroo, Care.com, Uber) (see 
Eurofound 2015). Online workers can be both high- and low-skilled (Wood et al., 2018) 
depending on the nature of the tasks (macro or micro) they perform (Gerber and 
Krzywdzinski 2017). In both cases the vulnerability of digital work is a common feature 
with power asymmetries enshrined in digital platforms between the platforms owners 
and the users (European Parliament 2017; Lehdonvirta 2016). These asymmetries are 
reflected in the nature of the work and the modes through which it is enacted. In ac-
cordance to Zysman and Newman (2006) ‘putting-out economy’ platform workers lack 
control over compensation for the work they do. Although it could be argued that 
workers are able to retain some autonomy over their place of work, which in turn can 
be helpful to individual workers in overcoming the barriers to labour market participa-
tion (Pesole et al. 2018), autonomy for digital workers cannot reduce workers’ expo-
sure to unpaid activities, particularly when unpaid work becomes a condition for secur-
ing paid work (Wood et al. 2018). This has an unprecedented social impact on workers. 
On the one hand, workers need to make themselves available as and when required by 
the market and be prepared to do unpaid work, including, for example, searching for 
tasks, taking qualification tests and researching requesters, doing preparatory work 











2. What social rules are appropriate for a platform ‘society’? 
 
It is clear from the above that although some platforms may open for entrepreneur-
ial opportunity, many others by their very nature prove to be winner-take-all markets, 
in which only one or two companies survive, and the platform owner is able to appro-
priate a generous portion of the entire value created by all the users on the platform. 
More important, however, is that as the power is centralized, the platform owner can 
become a virtual monopolist. In that case, the platform owner can squeeze the plat-
form community. However, the question of outcomes goes beyond the question of 
whether digital platforms spawn entrepreneurs or monopolists. We need to ask 
whether a society organized around platform owners servicing mini-entrepreneurs, 
contractors, and gig workers portends an even more unequal society. Does the answer 
depend on the character of platforms or on the policies and politics of the platform 
economy? If we want workers to accept the new arrangements, how do we assure 
them that if they accept the flexibility, they will not be the victims but rather the bene-
ficiaries of the ever-greater social value and wealth that is being created? This brings to 
the core of the question: the policy debate.  
However, the debate over policy is not straightforward or simple. As with all eco-
nomic transformations, the disruptions will create winners and losers. Who will decide 
how the results of increased productivity are distributed? The reality is that the win-
ners and losers in markets depend on who can participate and on what terms. Without 
rules there are no markets, and no market platforms. But what happens to the politics 
if important market rules are made unchallenged by the platform owners? How can 
policy encourage labor market arrangements that facilitate innovation, provide protec-
tion for workers, are efficient, and promote decent, sustainable lives for citizens? Col-
lective bargaining and the representation of workers operating on digital platforms are 
key issues.   
Collective bargaining can be an instrument enabling gig workers to protect them-
selves, thereby promoting decent working conditions on the platform. The function of 
collective bargaining is threefold: workplace democracy, redistribution and efficiency. 
Gig-workers face an inequality of bargaining power. By means of collective bargaining, 
they might be able to gain some bargaining power and change the way the workplace 
operates, and the way they are treated. It is important to bear in mind that collective 
bargaining allows workers to gain a voice and to take part in decisions on matters that 
affect their daily lives. That is why it is considered a basic human right. And this is also 
why it goes along another important aspect that is the representation of workers with-
in digital platforms. How and by whom to represent digital workers is less than 




straightforward. Although everybody seems to agree about that we must fight in vari-
ous ways the monopolistic trends by digital platforms (see Snricek 2017), how to build 
up power against these monopolistic trends as the way in which to ensure ‘democracy 
at work’ for digital workers is uncertain. On the one hand, although traditional trade 
unions are not insensible to digital workers’ needs we do often assist to organizing 
strategies by independent unions building up capacity to defend the interests of digital 
workers. On the other hand, ‘cooperative platforms’ (as platforms owned and con-
trolled by the people themselves) are indicated as a desirable and plausible solution. 
Yet, all the traditional problems of cooperatives (for example, the necessity of self-
exploitation  under capitalist social relations) could be made even worse by the mo-
nopolistic nature of platforms, the dominance of network effects, and the vast re-
sources behind these companies. Even if all its software were made open-source, a 
platform like Facebook would still have the weight of its existing data, network effects, 
and financial resources to fight off any cooperative rival (Ibidem).         
In any case, the way gig-workers do the job does not seem sufficient reason to de-
prive them of their right to collective bargaining and representation. On the redistribu-
tion of power from employers to employees, once again there are no distinctions be-
tween traditional employees and gig-workers. The online platform holds the power. As 
a result, gig-workers suffer from unfair or unjust terms of engagement just as employ-
ees would be subject to in the absence of collective bargaining. Finally, with regard to 
efficiency, collective bargaining laws were intended to limit industrial conflict, which is 
obviously detrimental to efficiency. We face the same situation with gig-workers. Col-
lective action against digital platforms has been reported in many parts of the world. 
Gig-workers can be organized and ready to take industrial action. Contract law is not 
suited to solve these problems, which will give rise to efficiency issues. In the end, all 
the questions examined illustrate that there is no difference between traditional em-
ployees and gig-workers. These workers on virtual platforms are not, economically 
speaking, entrepreneurs. On the contrary, they are individuals whose position is much 
closer to that of employees. Gig-workers are risk-averse, with limited access to finan-
cial and insurance markets and, as they are directly dependent on their labour to sur-
vive, they cannot diversify their risks nor negotiate their conditions individually. 
Hence, we are in need of new ‘integrated’ spaces of regulation and action for gig-
workers. Action in organizations takes place within a context characterized by different 
(i.e. operating within different organizational spheres) but interdependent actors 
which find a way collectively to frame action vis-a-vis one another. As Fligstein (1999) 
argues the purpose is to promote stability for the organizations themselves by finding a 
political compromise that allows the inter-firm interaction to evolve. Likewise, nation 




states after WW2 provided social regulatory schemes. At that time the character of 
state regulation of labor relations has created important advantages for workers and 
professions in their different bargaining positions vis-à-vis the employers (Burawoy 
1985). Similarly, we can argue that today the role of the state and public policy is cru-
cial in the way in which it can intervene governing the way in which technology (i.e. 
cloud, big data, algorithms and platforms) is deployed. This implies to avoid technolog-
ical determinism as technology itself will not directly influence our future and the soci-
ety at large. 
 
 
3. The role of the state and public policy  
 
The state should have the right to control the platforms. Antitrust cases and local 
regulation could break up monopolies and ban exploitative lean platforms. Govern-
ment agencies can impose new privacy controls and coordinated actions on tax avoid-
ance. Yet, we should not forget about some radical and indirect ways the state can in-
tervene as well. For example, investing the state’s vast resources into the technology 
which is necessary to support these digital platforms and offering them a public utili-
ties. In a recent study on digital platforms in Europe, commissioned by UNIEuropa 
Global Union, within the scope of a EU project, Ursula Huws, Neil Spencer and Matt 
Coates (2019) stress the importance of this aspect very clearly. She argues that there is 
no reason in principle why the technologies on which platform services are based could 
not be used in ways that contribute to the improvement of working conditions, the de-
velopment of local economies or to improve the quality of local services, in line with 
broader European public policies. For example, the improved matching of supply and 
demand for services enabled by platform technologies, if developed under the control 
of municipalities or non-profit bodies, or in the form of public-private partnerships, 
could be used to develop flexible systems for providing household services on a just-in-
time basis, ranging from ready meals for people who are sick, older and housebound to 
emergency baby-sitting services, transport services for the disables or care services 
that are more carefully tailored to individual needs. They could, in other words con-
tribute to the development of digitally managed welfare states fit for the 21st century. 
Making household services such as cleaning and maintenance more readily available 
could also serve to improve work-life balance, by easing the burden of housework 
which still falls disproportionately on women, thus contributing to gender equality in 
line with the spirit of the Directive on work-life balance for parents and careers. 




Hence, It would be possible to avoid the inequalities in access that are inherent in 
purely market-based services by integrating these platforms with public service provi-
sion. Huws (2019) indicates that it could be useful, for example, to make certain ser-
vices free to particular categories of users, to introduce means-testing, to apply exist-
ing rules on entitlement to public services to platform services, or to provide house-
holds with vouchers or a basic income part of which could be used to purchase such 
services. Placing these platform services wholly or partially under public management 
would bring them under democratic control, opening up the possibility for local com-
munities to have a say in service prioritization. This would mean to introduce a degree 
of public control which according to the researchers would support and retain service 
quality. This is because it could ensure, for example, that all workers are suitable 
trained, qualified and vetted, that health and safety standards are met and that work-
ers are properly compensated, with employment rights, decent working conditions and 
entitlements to maternity, paternity and parental leave, sick leave, holidays and pen-
sions.  
These policy initiatives are not the only ones. They could also be complemented by 
other policy steps to address the social protection, wages and working conditions of 
platform workers more generally. This would include clarification of their employment 
rights and a reform of social protection systems to better protect workers as often cat-
egorized as self-employed in this field. Some new possibilities opened by digitalization 
could be helpful and be used with this regards. For example the flexibility offered by 
online platforms for matching supply and demand in real time. This could make it easi-
er to meet the needs of users with unpredictable demands for services, such as people 
with intermittent medical conditions or workers on on-call contracts, by providing 
them with just-in-time provision of services (such as emergency baby-sitting or short-
term care). It would, further, be possible to combine these platform services with other 
public goals, such as ensuring that the food delivered is nutritious and ethically or local-
ly sourced.  
A local platform strategy could be combined with initiatives to ensure decent work-
ing conditions, professional training and employee benefits for the workforce. An inte-
gration with existing care and home help services could be achieved where relevant. 
Such local platform strategies could, in addition to creating new kinds of decent em-
ployment in local communities, bring other forms of benefit to local communities. If 
the platforms provide market services as well as subsidised ones, then the extra value 
created by them would be more likely to remain in the local economy, generating a 
range of multiplier effects. Once platforms are set up, there would be no reason in 
principle to restrict them to providing household services. They could also be used to 




create other sorts of employment for local job-seekers, such as, for example supplying 
business services to local start-ups or SMEs. Consultation with local stakeholders, in-
cluding local governments and trade unions, would, however, be required to ensure 
that they were not inadvertently undercutting existing businesses in so doing. Overall, 
as Huws, Spencer and Coates (2019) argue local economies and communities can bene-
fit of all this in several ways. The value generated by these new economic activities 
would remain in the local economy; the flexibility offered by digital technology in 
matching supply and demand in real time would result in better quality services, re-
sponsive to the varied needs of local residents; and the improved work-life balance of 
the local population could release more time for other activities such as creative work, 
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